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Keeping the Faith:
Corporate Governance After the Credit Crisis
Gabriel D. Rosenberg*
But alas! I never could keep a promise. I do not blame myselffor this weakness,
because the fault must lie in my physical organization. It is likely that such a
very liberal amount of space was given to the organ which enables me to make
promises, that the organ which should enable me to keep them was crowded
out.
- Mark Twain, The Innocents Abroad1
INTRODUCTION
In his new book, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken,2
Jonathan Macey analyzes the explicit and implicit agreements governing the re-
lationship between shareholders and the corporations in which they invest.' The
formal contracts, including the articles of incorporation and bylaws, that define
a corporation are sparse.4 Shareholders who invest huge sums of money in cor-
porations, furthermore, have no legal right to dividend payments from the cor-
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1. MARK TWAIN, THE INNOCENTS ABROAD, OR THE NEW PILGRIMS' PROGRESS 239
(1875).
2. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN (2008).
3. Other scholars have also discussed these explicit and implicit agreements. See, e.g.,
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 12 ("More often than not a reference to the corporation as an
entity will hide the essence of the transaction. So we often speak of the corpora-
tion as a 'nexus of contracts' or a set of implicit and explicit contracts. This refer-
ence, too, is shorthand for the complex arrangements of many sorts that those
who associate voluntarily in the corporation will work out among themselves.").
4- See MACEY, supra note 2, at 18, 29.
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poration.5 Thus, Macey argues, shareholders willing to invest under such a
scheme must be relying on more than just the few explicit legal rights contained
in formal agreements.' They must have rational expectations garnered from
past experience as to how corporations will behave. These expectations become
implicit promises between shareholders and corporate decisionmakers. 7 The
primary unstated promise is that the corporation is run to maximize profits.' In
addition, managers and directors implicitly promise they will not use corporate
funds to entrench themselves or give themselves excessive benefits.
Macey finds, however, that American corporations share Twain's funda-
mental weakness: an inability to keep promises when left unchecked. Similarly,
this weakness is due to the corporation's peculiar organization, specifically the
separation between ownership and control. While the shareholders of the firm
are its owners, professional managers, chosen by a board of directors, run the
firm. They do not have the same incentives as the shareholder-owners. This so-
called agency problem is at the heart of why American law needs corporate gov-
ernance.9 Effective corporate governance encourages corporate decisionmakers
to honor their promises to shareholders or credibly commits them to doing
so.' ° Ineffective corporate governance either ignores these promises or reduces
decisionmakers' incentives to keep them."
Macey's analysis of prominent American corporate governance mecha-
nisms finds, with startlingly little exception, that the most effective corporate
governance mechanisms are the most regulated by government. 2 Macey blames
this paradox on a combination of interest-group politics and regulators trying
to mollify citizens outraged by corporate greed and failures. 3 Lawmakers pass
5. Id. at 29-30, 40-41.
6. Id. at 18.
7. Id. at 8. The "promises" terminology is not unique to Macey's work. For example,
Easterbrook and Fischel also use it. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
3, at 6. Their use of "promises," however, is limited to promises made in explicit
contracts, although they note that managers "also promise, explicitly or otherwise,
to abide by the standards of 'fair dealing' embedded in fiduciary rules of corporate
law." Id. (emphasis added).
8. MACEY, supra note 2, at 2-3.
9. For an early rigorous and canonical treatment of corporations' agency problem,
see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
lO. Credible commitments are promises that involve some sort of detriment to a
promisor who breaks the promise. Without such credible commitment devices,
the promisee has no reason to believe the promisor will stick to the promise.
11. MACEY, supra note 2, at 1.
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id. at 16-17, 272-73.
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regulation that seems to keep corporations in check but that, in reality, does not
threaten the supremacy of directors or management.
14
This Review first describes Macey's finding that those corporate governance
structures most successful at ensuring promises to shareholders-in other
words, those effective as promissory corporate governance mechanisms-are
the most regulated and discouraged by government. It then turns to the impli-
cations of Macey's analysis in light of the drastic changes in the economy since
the publication of Corporate Governance.
I. PROMISSORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Through case studies of particularly popular corporate governance mecha-
nisms, Macey demonstrates that effective corporate governance is regulated or
discouraged by the government while ineffective corporate governance is en-








Figure 1: Division of corporate governance mechanisms along the effective/not
effective and encouraged/discouraged dimensions.
5
A. Encouraging Ineffective Corporate Governance
Macey's primary example of ineffective corporate governance reform is the
regulation of corporate boards of directors.
6 He attacks the blind hope that the
14. Id. at 16.
15. This table is adapted from id. at 50. The table on that page puts "Hedge Funds and
Private Equity" in the "Discouraged by Law and Regulation" column. I have
added "Unaffected" to the first column, as it seems to represent Macey's point
more accurately. There are certainly movements to regulate hedge funds and pri-
vate equity, which would move them into the "Discouraged" column. See infra
note 42 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 2, at 57, 104.
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investing public places in boards of directors, specifically in the efficacy of "in-
dependent" directors.17 Macey argues that the board of directors is asked to
serve two functions in constant tension with each other: helping management
run the corporation and monitoring management." Unable to discharge both
functions, boards will err on the side of aiding management and neglecting
oversight duties due to structural impediments to boards' overseeing function.
First, boards choose the managers they are meant to oversee. Firing managers
or signaling their incompetence by restricting their ability to act discredits the
directors' initial choice and indicates the directors' own incompetence.' 9 Direc-
tors faced with an objectively unsuccessful board, signaled by a decline in stock
price, may, to the detriment of shareholders, choose to believe managerial as-
surances about future improvement rather than attribute the failure to man-
agement's incompetence. Second, boards rely on senior management for the
information needed and to oversee operations.2" Self-interested managers will
be more forthcoming with such information to boards they perceive to be
friendly, and thus it will be less likely that those boards with the ability to moni-
tor management effectively will actually do so.2' In short, boards of directors are
"captured" by managers and are not an effective check on management.22 Regu-
lating board composition, therefore, is a way for politicians to appease constitu-
ents while not upsetting the strong management and director lobbies.
Macey dismisses another favorite cause of shareholder activists: shareholder
voting.2 3 He attributes its failure to the free-rider problem plaguing dispersed
shareholders, which makes it economically infeasible for small individual stake-
holders to amass enough information about a particular vote to make an in-
formed decision.2 4 Instead, shareholders tend to defer to management and the
board of directors.25
Even without direct regulation, the conventional wisdom is that fiduciary
duties-particularly the duties of loyalty and good faith-require directors and
17. Id. at 1o2 ("The argument is that the current trend of touting independent direc-
tors as some sort of corporate governance panacea is misguided.").
18. Id. at 52, 82.
19. Id. at 60 ("When management performs well, the directors who have selected, re-
cruited, and compensated these managers are viewed as able. When management
performs poorly, its performance casts a long and negative shadow on the direc-
tors.").
20. Id. at 6o-61.
21. Id. at 71.
22. Id. at 57, 83.
23. Id. at 199 ("[Wjhile shareholder voting probably does not do shareholders much
harm, it doesn't do them much good either.").
24. Id.
25. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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managers to keep their promises to shareholders. Macey argues, however, that
holding directors and officers accountable as fiduciaries requires solving the
problem of dispersed ownership.26 Dispersed ownership, a hallmark of Ameri-
can corporations, results in cost impediments to litigation."7 While the class ac-
tion derivative suit has arisen in response to these challenges, Macey argues that
these suits only benefit the plaintiff's bar.' The proliferation of settlements
29
and the derivative suit requirement of demand (or proving futility of such a
demand) on the board3" make it clear that fiduciary duties cannot explain why
investors are willing to put their money in the hands of corporations. Credible
commitment to promises must be involved.
B. Discouraging Effective Corporate Governance
While Macey believes that independent directors, lawsuits, and shareholder
voting rights are a waste of corporate governance energy, he finds that the mar-
ket for corporate control is a useful corporate governance tool.3 The success of
corporate boards can be easily measured with one metric: the corporation's
stock price.3 2 Stock prices represent the market's determination of a firm's
worth; a maximized stock price, therefore, is a signal that the corporation is up-
holding its promise to maximize profit.3 When corporate leadership fails, stock
prices decrease. The corporation then becomes a takeover target.
Yet the market for corporate control has been rendered powerless by law
and regulation encouraged by directors and managers. They know that a func-
tioning market for corporate control, unlike independent boards of directors,
could have detrimental effects on their ability to evade meaningful corporate
governance.34 For example, the Williams Act makes takeovers more expensive
by requiring outsiders to announce publicly when they have obtained a 5% stake
in a company.35 Macey argues that this transparency makes takeovers less likely
because bidders must provide competitors with information about their strat-
26. MACEY, supra note 2, at 131.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 136-45.
29. Id. at 145-47, 151-53.
30. Id. at 134-36.
31. Id. at 118.
32. Id. at 120.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 118.
35. An Act Providing for Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership of Securities
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was passed on July 29, 1968. Pub. L. No.
90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e),
78n(d)-(f) (2006)).
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egy.36 He similarly blasts the Delaware courts' acceptance of "poison pills," cor-
porate defensive mechanisms that make it harder to mount successful takeovers
against management. 7 He considers the cases upholding poison pills "judicial
fiat [by which] the Delaware courts have removed from the marketplace the
hostile tender offer, which is the most powerful corporate governance device in
the shareholders' corporate governance arsenal. "38
According to Macey, the newest heroes of corporate governance are private
equity funds and hedge funds that have turned from passive investors into cor-
porate governance activists.3 9 Some of these funds take stakes in corporations
believing they can force governance change and profit off the resulting increase
in share value.40 Like the actors in the market for corporate control, private eq-
uity funds and hedge funds step in when they see a disconnect between share
price and the assets of the corporations. 41 Consistent with Macey's hypothesis
regarding regulation of successful corporate governance mechanisms, legislators
and corporate boards have for many years agitated for regulation of these here-
tofore lightly regulated investment vehicles.
4
II. PROMISSORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The current financial crisis, which has significantly changed the economic
world since Macey published Corporate Governance one year ago, will undoubt-
edly test Macey's promissory theory. 43 In the short term, multiple factors point
to increased oversight of corporations: the slowdown in capital markets for pro-
ject funding, public attention to a struggling economy and resulting bailouts,
36. MACEY, supra note 2, at 122.
37. Id. at 123-24.
38. Id. at 126.
39. Id. at 272 ("Private equity and hedge fund investors appear to be the great, shining
beacon of hope on an otherwise bleak landscape.").
40. Id. at 272.
41. Id. at 246.
42. Id. at 243-44; see also Direct Regulation of Hedge Funds is Under Study, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 4, 1999, at C18 (describing attempts to regulate hedge funds); Deborah
Solomon, SEC Pushing Proposal to Regulate Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2004,
at C4 (same). The SEC's attempt to regulate hedge funds was struck down by the
D.C. Circuit in 2006. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
43. Macey acknowledged this fact in an audio interview discussing the book. Inter-
view by Kaitlin Thomas, Assistant Dir. of Pub. Affairs, Yale Law Sch., with Jona-
than R. Macey, Deputy Dean and Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corpo-
rate Fin., & Sec. Law, Yale Law Sch., in New Haven, CT. (Oct. 27, 2008), available
at http://cs.law.yale.edu/files/folders/ylspodcasts/entry253.aspx.
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the discovery of massive Ponzi schemes, 44 and the increased scrutiny of corpo-
rations and financial institutions promised by the Obama Administration. 45 The
eyes of the American public are focused on corporate executives who profited in
boom times and are now expected to suffer in a recession. This focus has al-
ready led to bank managers taking no or nominal bonus pay for 2008. This
symbolic gesture signals their inability to work unfettered from external over-
sight.
46
Corporations will face increasing impediments to debt financing in the
post-credit crisis world. The calling card of this crisis is the inability of borrow-
ers to repay debts and the way in which such an inability propagates through
the financial system. As the crisis continues to move from Wall Street to Main
Street, many more American corporations are likely to fail and declare bank-
ruptcy. Unpaid creditor banks will tighten lines of credit more readily in a
world where "nightmare scenarios" seem far more likely than before. As the
supply of debt shrinks, interest rates will rise in equilibrium. Companies that
could have borrowed in the pre-credit crisis world may no longer be able to do
so at affordable rates.
Faced with high interest rates, corporations will be unable to borrow and
will be under tighter watch by nervous directors and shareholders. Mistakes will
be more critical and more likely to lead to directors firing management. Fraud
will be more easily detectable as profit margins disappear, and fraud will not be
tolerated. It seems, then, that the credit crisis might have a beneficial effect on
the efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms, at least while the crisis con-
tinues.
As capital markets revive, however, decreased debt availability will not
mean an end to funding but instead that corporations will have to turn more
fully to the equity markets to fund new projects. Macey's theory predicts that
this shift to equity will improve corporate governance for upstart companies;
initial public offerings, which should become more frequent after the economy
44. While the focus on Bernard Madoff's $50 billion fraud is the primary example of
recent public attention to Ponzi schemes, a rash of other Ponzi schemes has been
subsequently uncovered. The Madoff scandal, therefore, provides an excellent ex-
ample of how the increased awareness of fraud (in this case, investors attempting
to remove their money) can lead to an avalanche of discovered malfeasance. See,
e.g., Leslie Wayne, The Mini-Madoffs: Troubled Times Are Bringing More Ponzi In-
quiries to Light, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 2009, at B1. See generally Amitai Aviram,
Counter-Cyclical Enforcement of Corporate Law, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2008) (dis-
cussing the increased attention to corporate fraud during economic downturns).
45. The government, which can demand document production and does not have the
dispersed shareholder problem, has forcefully entered the corporate governance
fray. See, e.g., David Enrich & Damian Paletta, Crisis on Wall Street: Agreement
Boosts Citi Oversight, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2009, at C3.
46. See, e.g., Dan Fitzpatrick & Amy Or, BofA's Chief Decides To Forgo Bonuses-
Action Mirrors Other Banks' Moves, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 20o09, at C1.
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improves, provide the investing public with basic information that investors re-
quire to form proper expectations.
47
The story for mature corporations inspires less hope. Economists since the
198os, most notably Michael Jensen, have argued that debt financing decreases
the inherent agency problems between shareholders and management. 4' Debt
limits managerial freedom to engage in projects that are not in shareholders'
best interest by requiring management to produce, each period, at least the
money necessary to pay interest on the debt. If the corporation does not pay its
debtholders, it faces bankruptcy. Thus, according to Jensen's free cash flow the-
ory, the increase in stock price when corporations issue debt 49 is due to the fact
that shareholders benefit when managers have less free cash with which to bene-
fit themselves."0 Since shareholders have no legal right to demand dividends but
creditors have the right to put delinquent debtor corporations into bankruptcy,
debt financing is a credible commitment while equity financing is not. One us-
ing Macey's vocabulary would say that having a significant amount of debt is an
effective corporate governance mechanism because it provides a credible com-
mitment that managers will keep promises to shareholders.
Contrary to initial perceptions, therefore, the decrease in available debt fi-
nancing sure to result from the current crisis might well increase the financial
freedom of managers and, by extension, the directors that hire them. Share-
holders will be left without the protection of keeping management under the
constantly looming specter of high interest payments. As a result, it will be
more difficult to credibly commit management and directors to keep promises
made to investors. Corporate governance will suffer.
In a post-credit crisis world, therefore, Macey's criticisms of the hope
placed in independent directors holds special relevance. The little benefit that
independent directors currently provide when overseeing management will dis-
appear as the natural limitations on managers imposed by debt financing dis-
appear. Thus, Macey's promissory theory predicts that captured directors will
have even less incentive to monitor management closely in the post-crisis
world. Small mistakes will be cushioned by voluntary dividend payments rather
than exposed by mandatory interest payments on debt.
Hedge funds and private equity are unlikely to be able to assist significantly
in corporate governance in a post-crisis economy. These investment vehicles are
likely to be among the institutions most affected by the decrease in debt financ-
47. MACEY, supra note 2, at 127-29 (discussing the positive corporate governance ef-
fects of due diligence associated with initial public offerings).
48. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Take-
overs, 76 AM. EcoN. REV. 323 (1986).
49. This comparison is relative to issuing equity.
50. Jensen, supra note 48, at 323 ("Conflicts of interest between shareholders and
managers over payout policies are especially severe when the organization gener-
ates substantial free cash flow.").
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ing availability.5' Activist hedge funds, in particular, rely heavily on the ability to
borrow. They use such leverage to turn their capital into an interest in a com-
pany in order to agitate for corporate governance change. This leverage and the
ability to take short positions" differentiate these funds from highly regulated
mutual funds. Without the leverage needed to take these positions, hedge funds
and private equity funds may be rendered as ineffective as mutual funds in the
corporate governance arena.
Political and public sentiment also militate against looking to hedge funds
and private equity funds as the post-crisis corporate governance saviors. Rightly
or wrongly, investors and analysts have placed a sizable amount of blame on
these "speculative" investors and their lack of regulation for the economic
downturn." Predictably, lawmakers have called for regulation and have recently
introduced regulatory legislation in Congress. 4 Corporate directors and mana-
gerial lobbies may thus support such regulation.
What, then, happens to corporate governance? If Macey's promissory the-
ory is a guide, perhaps corporate governance activists should work towards the
reemergence of the market for corporate control. Some corporate control
transactions, such as stock-for-stock mergers, are not strongly predicated on the
ability to borrow. These corporate control transactions, which allow the market
to eliminate bad management using objectively determinable stock prices, are
unlikely to be as affected by the credit crisis as transactions affected by hedge
funds and private equity. Managers and directors will always seek to protect
themselves from corporate raiders. They will always, therefore, want to keep
shareholders happy with high share prices. To reinstate the market for corpo-
rate control in full force, however, requires repealing regulation that disrupts
natural market processes. For example, lawmakers could weaken the Williams
Act and judges could be more critical of poison pills. Due to the current climate
51. The difficulties have already begun. For a discussion of financing problems for
hedge funds, see Susan Pulliam & Jenny Strasburg, Brokerages Tighten Hedge Fund
Financing, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2009, at Al.
52. Short-selling stock allows an investor to bet on a downward movement in share
price by, in the most typical case, borrowing stock and immediately selling it. To
return the borrowed stock, the investor purchases a share in the open market,
profiting from the decrease in share price between the sale of the stock and its
purchase.
53. Blaming hedge funds started early in the chronology of the current crisis. See, e.g.,
Gregory Zuckerman, Are Hedge Funds Root of All Evil or Convenient Scapegoats?
Wall Streeters Urge Regulators To Apply Heat to Managers, WALL ST. J., July 18,
2008, at C2 ("Members of Wall Street's establishment, including J.P. Morgan
Chase & Co. Chairman James Dimon and top corporate-attorney Martin Lipton,
have urged regulators to step up their patrol [of hedge funds] .... ").
54. See, e.g., Jenny Strasburg, Legislators Seek Hedge-Fund Disclosure, WALL ST. J., Feb.
2, 2009, at C2 (discussing the bipartisan introduction of the Hedge Fund Trans-
parency Act by Senators Carl Levin and Charles Grassley).
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of increased regulation rather than deregulation,55 however, these steps appear
unlikely to occur within the next few years.
CONCLUSION
In Corporate Governance, Jonathan Macey argues that managers engaged in
interest-group politics have created a paradoxical result: regulating effective
corporate governance mechanisms while promoting ineffective ones. Although
this paradox would be dangerous in a thriving economy, it is even more prob-
lematic when economic changes weaken the few remaining effective governance
mechanisms. Specifically, shareholders benefit from activist hedge funds and
private equity funds. They also benefit from management needing to make re-
quired interest payments on debt. By decreasing debt availability and the ability
of funds to obtain leverage, the credit crisis threatens to remove these important
shareholder tools. If there are no changes to corporate governance, managers
will be free to break their most fundamental promises to shareholders.
Government policymakers, therefore, should use the upheaval in the finan-
cial markets as an opportunity to reexamine their basic beliefs about market
processes. In order to institute useful-rather than simply popular-legislative
and regulatory change, these policymakers need a comprehensive theory of cor-
porate governance that explains the difference between effective and ineffective
rules. Corporate Governance is a strong step forward in developing such a the-
ory.
55. Increased regulation was a major theme of the 2008 presidential election. In the
first presidential debate, then-U.S. Senator Barack Obama said that the financial
crisis "is a final verdict on eight years of failed economic policies-promoted by
George Bush, supported by Senator McCain-a theory that basically says that we
can shred regulations and consumer protections and give more and more to the
most, and somehow prosperity will trickle down." Laura Meckler, Elizabeth
Holmes & Amy Chozick, Obama, McCain Spar on War, Financial Crisis in First
Debate, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2008, at Ai.
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